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BEYOND THE REASONS STATED 
IN JUDGMENTS 
Giorgio Gaja * 
THE LEGAL REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: TO-
W ARDS A EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE. By Joxerramon Bengoetxea. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1993. Pp. xvi, 294. $49.95. 
I 
In the context of the abundant literature on European Community 
(EC) law - which is mainly devoted to describing, often uncritically, 
the decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) - Joxerramon 
Bengoetxea's1 book provides a welcome contribution. It attempts to 
answer some of the fundamental questions concerning the role that the 
ECJ plays in the development of EC law. 
No doubt the ECJ has added significantly to many areas of EC 
law. It has also been regarded as authoritative by the other EC institu-
tions and has successfully imposed its views on Member States' courts, 
which in most cases are entrusted with the application of EC law and 
the solution of conflicts between EC law and Member States' legisla-
tion. Although article 177 of the EC Treaty established the ECJ as the 
ultimate interpreter of EC law, this Treaty mandate did not necessar-
ily provide a guarantee that the ECJ's rulings would generally be ac-
cepted in practice. It seems fair to state that widespread acceptance 
has in fact occurred, despite the ECJ's strong profederalist line on is-
sues such as (i) the competence of EC institutions over areas - like 
the protection of the environment - about which the Treaty was orig-
inally silent; (ii) the supremacy of EC law over Member States' legisla-
tion; and (iii) the ability of private parties to invoke Treaty provisions 
and acts by EC institutions that apparently require implementing 
legislation. 
How did the ECJ achieve all this? Joseph Weiler provided one 
ingenious explanation about ten years ago2 when he linked the judicial 
development of EC law with the EC decisional framework: the fact 
that EC institutions had been unable, for political reasons, to adopt 
major legislative measures without the consent of the governments of 
• Professor of International Law, University of Florence. Laurea in Giurisprudenza 1960, 
Rome; Libera docenza, International Law 1968; Ll.D. (h.c.) 1985, Dickinson. - Ed. 
1. Associate Professor of Law, University of the Basque Country. 
2. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Community System: The Dual Character of Supranational-
ism, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 267 (1981). 
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all the Member States made it possible for the latter to accept the 
supremacy of EC law and other innovations that the ECJ mas-
terminded. In other words, had EC legislation progressed by majority 
decisions as the Treaty provided, the Court's caselaw would have 
come under political challenge. This explanation would now require 
some adjustment if one intended to confirm it with regard to the pres-
ent circumstances, because significant developments have taken place 
in the normative process, mostly through the Single European Act 
(SEA) and the Treaty on the European Union - treaties which have 
come into force after their unanimous acceptance on the part of all the 
Member States. A series of important decisions have been adopted by 
the EC Council by majority vote. Nevertheless, while the pace of de-
velopment of EC law by the judiciary has slowed, the earlier achieve-
ments have not been undermined and still remain unchallenged. 
Bengoetxea defines his method as follows: 
Most of the judgments analysed give a picture of the ECJ as actively 
engaging in the European Community project and the aim of this book is 
partly to explain how this is possible and to reconstruct the work of the 
Court. But the questions framed and addressed are primarily those of a 
legal philosopher or legal theoretician and not so much those of a polit-
ical scientist or a legal sociologist. My main interest has been to analyse 
how the Court has reconstructed EC law and to reconstruct or represent 
the work of the Court itself. [p. viii] 
This approach clearly restricts the author's ability to give an explana-
tion of the Court's role within the EC system. It also limits the scope 
of his analysis of individual decisions. However, Bengoetxea does not 
intend to consider only the legal justifications given by the ECJ, which 
is the main object of Part II of the book; he refers in Part I also to 
"discovery," which he defines as those 
factors that, put together, actually led to the decision as it was reached at 
a given point in space and time and to the real process whereby the deci-
sion was reached .... These factors can be of a psychological [nature] 
(hence the expression "psychological process"), of a sociological nature 
(factors relevant to the explanation of social action), or they can be idio-
syncratic factors: related to the situation and context, or special charac-
teristics of the institution such as resources, time, working conditions 
etc. [p. 114] 
Bengoetxea does not go far in the direction of "discovery." He 
makes one attempt with regard to the Polydor 3 case: 
Sometimes the Court does not echo those justifying grounds 
although one could postulate that they figured prominently in its deliber-
ations. For instance, comparative-law arguments or, as in Polydor, argu-
ments from economic consequences: the Commission argued that if the 
Court's interpretation of articles 30 and 36 of the EEC Treaty were ex-
tended to the similar provisions (articles 14 and 23) contained in the 
3. Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v. Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 E.C.R. 329. 
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Community's Free Trade Agreement with Portugal, that would lead to a 
situation where non-Member States might obtain all the rights of Com-
munity membership (in the present case, the doctrine of the exhaustion 
of industrial property rights: no trade restrictions justified on the ground 
of the protection of industrial and commercial property when the holder 
of those rights has already consented to their marketing) without having 
to assume the corresponding obligations. [p. 124; citation omitted] 
Bengoetxea further mentions the same judgment when he notes that 
"at other times the Court does refer in its justification to substantive 
and consequentialist arguments of the sort which featured promi-
nently but sotto voce in Polydor" (p. 125). 
In Polydor, the Court was requested to determine whether some 
provisions in the Free Trade Agreement between the EC and Portu-
gal4 required the same wide meaning as the identically worded articles 
in the EC Treaty.5 Another issue was whether private parties could 
invoke the provisions in the Agreement in judicial proceedings. 6 Sev-
eral Member States, and to some extent the Commission, took a nega-
tive attitude on both issues before the Court. The alleged lack of 
reciprocity on Portugal's part was one of the arguments supporting 
their stance; Advocate General Rozes stressed it in her opinion. 7 The 
ECJ did not rely on the lack-of-reciprocity argument in Polydor, how-
ever, and even rejected it shortly afterwards in Kupferberg, 8 another 
case involving the same Free Trade Agreement. Although the Free 
Trade Agreement was widely regarded as more beneficial to the EC 
than to Portugal, it may be true that in Po/ydor, as Bengoetxea sug-
gests, and later in Kupferberg, the Court took some economic consid-
erations into account when giving a stricter meaning to the provisions 
in the Agreement than to the corresponding texts in the EC Treaty. 
However, another reason not mentioned by Bengoetxea may have 
played a significant role in Po/ydor. Knowing that Portugal would not 
be bound by the Court's interpretation, the ECJ may have preferred to 
exercise judicial self-restraint and to leave the settlement of the ques-
4. See Council Regulation 2844/72 Concluding an Agreement Between the European Eco-
nomic Community and the Portuguese Republic, 1972 O.J. SPEC. Eo. (L 301) 166, 167 (reciting 
the text of the Agreement). The Agreement was signed on July 22, 1972. The ECJ did not find it 
necessary to address the question of direct effect. 
5. 1982 E.C.R. at 333. 
6. 1982 E.C.R. at 333. 
7. 1982 E.C.R. at 354-55. In her later opinion in Kupferberg, Advocate General Rozes said: 
To recognize a provision of that Agreement as having direct effect without the guarantee 
that an individual may rely on the provision in Portugal on the same terms and with the 
same results in relation to legal protection would, by reason of the absence of reciprocity, 
lead to the Community's being at a disadvantage and that would not correspond to the 
discernible intention of the Contracting Parties. 
Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg & Cie. KG a.A., 1982 E.C.R. 3641, 3674. 
See infra note 8 and accompanying text. 
8. In Kupferberg, the ECJ said: "[T]he fact that the courts of one of the parties consider that 
certain of the stipulations in the agreement are of direct application ••• is not in itself such as to 
constitute a lack of reciprocity in the implementation of the agreement." 1982 E.C.R. at 3664. 
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tion concerning the protection of trademarks for imported products to 
negotiations between the parties to the Agreement in a political forum. 
Bengoetxea also makes an attempt at "discovery" in discussing the 
series of cases concerning the European Parliament's standing to chal-
lenge the validity of acts taken by other EC institutions (pp. 105-11, 
124-25, 236, 246, 249). The Court first refused the European Parlia-
ment standing in Comitology 9 and later reversed itself in Chernobyl 10 
though only insofar as Parliament's prerogatives are affected. 
Bengoetxea approvingly notes Advocate General Van Gerven's opin-
ion in Chernobyl to the effect that the earlier decision by the ECJ 
should be regarded "as a refusal to address Parliament's demand to 
modify the whole institutional balance created by the Treaties and 
thus indirectly as a careful decision on the part of the Court to avoid 
overstepping its role by deciding a politically delicate question in a 
way which contradicts the SEA."11 Although this view comes from 
the Court, it appears to overstate somewhat the importance of the 
standing issue and the weight that political considerations may have 
played in the Court's first decision. Parliament's powers were unlikely 
to be affected substantially, whether or not it obtained standing to 
challenge the validity of acts taken by the Council or the Commission. 
The ECJ's stance in Chernobyl the more recent decision, does not nec-
essarily imply a reappraisal of Parliament's role. The Court at-
tempted, not to alter Parliament's powers, but rather, as the ECJ 
noted, to enable Parliament "to maintain the institutional balance" 
within the context of fulfilling its "task of ensuring that in the interpre-
tation and application of the Treaties the law is observed."12 The 
ECJ's role, rather than the European Parliament's role, would have 
been restricted in practice had the Court denied the Parliament stand-
ing. Moreover, the second decision appears to aim at a more satisfac-
tory overall solution, in light of the fact that in Les Verts, 13 the Court 
had already recognized the right of other institutions to challenge Par-
liament's binding acts - a right that Parliament strongly contested at 
first. Article 173 of the EC Treaty as it originally stood provided for 
neither this right nor Parliament's standing. Through an amendment 
to article 173 adopted with no apparent difficulty in the Treaty on the 
European Union, the EC Treaty now incorporates both Parliament's 
standing and the right of other institutions to challenge Parliament's 
9. Case 302/87, Parliament v. Council (Comitology), 1988 E.C.R. 5615. The ECJ said: 
"[T]he applicable provisions, as they stand at present, do not enable the Court to recognize the 
capacity of the European Parliament to bring an action for annulment." 1988 E.C.R. at 5644. 
10. Case C-70/88, Parliament v. Council (Chernobyl), 1990 E.C.R. 1-2041, 1-2073. 
11. P. 125 (discussing 1990 E.C.R. at 1-2056-57); see also p. 110. 
12. 1990 E.C.R. at 2073. 
13. Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1339. The ECJ 
held that "an action for annulment may lie against measures adopted by the European Parlia-
ment intended to have legal effects vis-tl-vis third parties." 1986 E.C.R. at 1366. 
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binding acts, to the extent outlined by the ECJ in Chernobyl and Les 
Verts respectively. 
The absence of individual opinions and the collective drafting of 
judgments partially explain the fact that "discovery" often yields little 
with regard to the decisions of the ECJ. While judges publish articles 
that refer to decisions given by the ECJ, they generally do not criti-
cally analyze their own decisions, and on the whole they faithfully 
comply with their obligation under article 2 of the ECJ statute "to 
preserve the secrecy of the deliberations of the Court."14 The Com-
mission and Member States often intervene in proceedings before the 
Court and may bring economic and social consequences of prospective 
rulings to the Court's attention. However, the written briefs are not 
usually available to scholars, who must rely upon the short summaries 
included in the judges' reports for the hearings, the advocate generals' 
opinions, and the judgments. Confidential information, moreover, 
serves only to provide background knowledge for the Court, as it may 
not be published. 
Yet, hard as it is to base "discovery" on significant elements, its 
importance to a court that often deals with major political issues can-
not be exaggerated. A variety of factors that are not stated in the 
ECJ's decisions often influence the answers to even apparently techni-
cal questions. The much-discussed question of the horizontal direct 
effect of EC directives provides a pertinent example. 
Under article 189 of the EC Treaty, a directive "shall be binding, 
as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form 
and methods."15 This article was originally understood to imply that 
implementing legislation by Member States was required before a rule 
stated in a directive could be invoked in courts. However, in a series 
of decisions in the 1970s, the ECJ held that some provisions included 
in directives - because they were unconditional, complete, and pre-
cise - would have direct effect, that is, they could be invoked in 
courts against Member State authorities. This part of the ECJ's 
caselaw caused the most criticism by ,some of the Member States' 
higher courts - the French Conseil d'Etat in Cohn-Bendit 16 and the 
German Bundesfinanzhof in Re Value Added Tax Directives 17 -
which determined that the ECJ's view was incompatible with the 
wording of article 189 of the EC Treaty and thus refused to accept the 
idea that directives could have direct effect. This refusal came at a 
14. See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITIES, SELECTED INSTRUMENTS 
RELATING TO THE ORGANIZATION, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE OF THE COURT 61 (1993). 
15. TREATY EsTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC CoMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 
189. 
16. Minister of the Interior v. Cohn-Bendit, 1 C.M.L.R. 543 (1980). 
17. 1 C.M.L.R. 527 (1982). 
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time of vehement media criticism of the ECJ's activism, especially in 
France.18 
It hardly seems a coincidence that, after such intense criticism, the 
ECJ limited the direct effect of directives by specifying that directives, 
unlike provisions in the EC Treaty, could not be invoked by an indi-
vidual against another individual, or, in other words, could not have 
horizontal direct effect. The Court first achieved this goal by stating in 
Ratti 19 that the direct effect of a directive was a sanction for Member 
State noncompliance with their obligations under the directive. This 
statement appeared to imply that directives could not be invoked 
against individuals, a point that was made shortly after Ratti in an 
influential article written by Judge Pescatore in a leading French peri-
odical. 20 The ECJ emphatically asserted that directives could only 
have vertical effects in Marshall. 2 1 
While Bengoetxea does not fail to refer to ~he decisions in Ratti 
and Marshall and also to the French Conseil d'Etat's ruling in Cohn-
Bendit (pp. 202, 237-38), he does not examine any political factors. 
He leaves the reader with the observation that the ECJ asserted the 
existence of direct effect "by saying that it must go beyond the letter of 
the provision and have regard to the useful effect of EC law," whereas 
it rejected the idea of a horizontal direct effect "by claiming, in a rhe-
torical appeal to authority, that it was strictly adhering to the wording 
of article 189. This contradiction must be criticized from the point of 
view of rational practical discourse" (p. 238). While Bengoetxea cor-
rectly appraises the inconsistency, he fails to elaborate on what clearly 
appears to be a sign that an explanation should be sought elsewhere. 
To reinforce what seems to be the more plausible reconstruction of 
the ECJ's caselaw on the horizontal direct effect issue, it is also signifi-
cant to note that, once the resistance of Member States' courts to the 
direct effect of directives subsided, the ECJ to some extent proceeded 
toward recognizing their horizontal direct effect. The Court stated in 
its 1990 decision in Marleasing 22 that Member States' legislation, even 
if enacted before a directive, had to be interpreted in cases between 
individuals "in the light of the wording and the purpose" of the direc-
tive even, as was no doubt the case in Mar/easing, at the cost of dis-
18. See HIALTE RAsMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
339-57 (1986). 
19. Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629. The ECJ held that "a 
Member State which has not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive in the 
prescribed periods may not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the obliga-
tions which the directive entails." 1979 E.C.R. at 1642. 
20. Pierre Pescatore, L'Effet des Directives Communautaires: Une Tentative de Dimythifica-
tion, RE.CUEIL DALLOZ SIREY 171, 176 (1980). 
21. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and S.-W. Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1986 
E.C.R. 723, 749. 
22. Case C106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentaci6n SA, 1990 
E.C.R. 1-4135. 
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torting national legislation.23 Thus, directives, although they are still 
denied horizontal direct effect, may impinge in practice on the rela-
tions between individuals. 
II 
The book's strength clearly lies in its examination of the reasons 
given by the Court in its decisions. Bengoetxea proceeds on the basis 
of the analytical theory of law. His is a remarkable effort, which cer-
tainly contributes to a better understanding of the ECJ's caselaw. 
Moreover, while some references to legal theorists have little relevance 
to the object of the study and the author's language appears at times 
unnecessarily complex, his analysis has the great advantage of lucidity 
and precision. 
In systematizing the ECJ's decisions, Bengoetxea draws a distinc-
tion between clear cases and hard cases, the latter category encom-
passing those cases in which an interpretation in the narrow sense of 
the word is required. The author rightly notes that the ECJ's practice 
runs as follows: "Justification in clear cases is rather straightforward 
and follows roughly a deductive scheme. Justification in hard cases 
follows deductive schemes only as a general outline: the final decision 
is presented deductively, but the intermediate, enthymematic steps 
cannot be deductively justified, although they can be rationally justi-
fied in the law" (p. 193). 
Both types of cases contain a major premise in a syllogism. In 
clear cases, the major premise may represent the contents of an earlier 
ruling by the ECJ on the same or a similar question. Bengoetxea 
notes: "The main rationale of acte clair in this type of ECJ decision is 
authority" (p. 205). In other instances, clarity of the norm may be "a 
felicitous, sincere statement" or else "a device to disguise interpreta-
tion" (p. 206). 
In so-called hard cases - of the type that "usually involves a 
doubt regarding the formulation of the premisses that will lead to a 
decision in the law" (p. 221) -justification is seen as an attempt 
to persuade the legal audience that the adopted interpretation does no 
violence to the legal order and that its consequences are at least not un-
desirable. Several arguments (reasons) will be offered by the interpreter 
in support of the proposed interpretation. These arguments mutually 
support each other in order to persuade an audience that the proposed 
interpretation is more coherent and fits better with existing law and leads 
to better results than other rival interpretations (coherence and conse-
quences are relative). [p. 225] 
This passage rightly points to the ECJ's traditional practice of giv-
ing more than one argument to justify a certain result. However, it 
should also be noted that, especially in recent years, the Court states 
23. 1990 E.C.R. at 1-4158-59. 
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its reasons very briefly. In many.preliminary rulings on the interpreta-
tion of EC law, one of the few paragraphs giving the reasons fully 
corresponds to the operative part of the judgment. While the use of 
this technique does not imply that there is no justification, it provides 
an indication of the ECJ's reluctance to develop arguments. Scantily 
reasoned judgments may have the advantages of offering fewer oppor-
tunities for the reader's criticism and of leaving the ECJ freer when 
making further decisions; however, such judgments hardly persuade. 
This new way of stating the reasons has yet to affect the overall au-
thoritativeness of the ECJ's decisions. One possible explanation is 
that, while it is expected that a judicial decision should not read like 
an oracle, political actors and Member State courts do not consider 
the reasons for the decision to be that important. 
Bengoetxea recalls that the ECJ stated some general guidelines on 
the interpretation of EC law only in CILFIT. 24 The first .of these 
guidelines requires an attempt to reconcile the different language ver-
sions of Community provisions, although the ECJ often tends to play 
down the inevitable differences in the meaning of texts written in the 
ten official languages. The second guideline is more significant: it 
states that "legal concepts do not necessarily have the same meaning 
in Community law and in the law of the various Member States."25 
The idea that concepts of EC law are autonomous must be read in 
conjunction with the third and last guideline: "Finally, every provi-
sion of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted 
in the light of the provisions of Community law as a whole, regard 
being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the 
date on which the provision in question is to be applied."26 
The ECJ's criteria for interpretation in fact go further than those 
criteria that were outlined in CILFIT. Bengoetxea groups them into 
different categories: "semiotic criteria" (pp. 234-40), "systemic and 
contextual criteria". (pp. 240-51), and "dynamic criteria" (pp. 251-62). 
He provides the following summary of the various categories: 
Semiotic criteria look at the linguistic features of the language which 
legal norms use. Contextual criteria lay the emphasis on the static per-
spective; they place the text under interpretation in a spatial context 
(sedes). Systemic criteria are used with a view to drawing inferences 
from different norms which are interrelated. They give a static picture of 
BC law. I have classified under the general term "dynamic criteria" 
three types of arguments: functional, teleological, and consequentialist 
arguments. These arguments are related to the dynamic context in 
which norms operate. Arguments are drawn from the value-laden con-
ception that norms are to be interpreted in such a way that they function 
24. Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 
E.C.R. 3415. 
25. 1982 E.C.R. at 3430. 
26. 1982 E.C.R. at 3430. 
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effectively (functional arguments), or from the objectives which some 
norms of the legal order either formulate explicitly or are seen as pursu-
ing (teleological arguments), and finally from the consequences to which 
the proposed interpretation for those norms leads (consequentialist argu-
ments). These criteria give something like a moving picture of EC law: 
each figure in the picture is understood in its relations to the other 
figures and in its development in the picture through time. [pp. 251-52] 
While most ofBengoetxea's examples of the different categories are 
accurate, there are some exceptions. One of them is the view ex-
pressed about the Defrenne 1121 case, concerning equal pay for men 
and women: 
[T]he Court limited in time the effect of the interpretation given to arti-
cle 119 in the sense that the judgment could not be invoked in support of 
claims for periods of retribution prior to the judgment, because other-
wise important economic losses could follow to many Member States 
from actions for recovery. [p. 256] 
This view may be true if one looks at the case from the perspective of 
"discovery,"28 while from the point of view of "justification'' - which 
the author adopts in the relevant part of the book - one would have 
to come to the opposite conclusion. The ECJ said: 
Although the practical consequences of any judicial decision must be 
carefully taken into account, it would be impossible to go so far as to 
diminish the objectivity of the law and compromise its future application 
on the ground of the possible repercussions which might result, as re-
gards the past, from such a judicial decision. 29 
Bengoetxea notes that 
the most interesting substantive reasons are those which originate in 
principles which did not originally appear in the Treaties, e.g. human 
rights (in their liberal, social, and cultural versions), the protection of the 
environment, consumer protection, etc. The acceptability approach is 
most relevant in such cases; it could be argued that some of these values 
have made their way into EC law (through judicial decision-making and 
through legislation) when there has been an "adequate" (rational?) con-
sensus concerning their urgency within the different audiences to which 
decisions are addressed. [p. 273; footnote omitted] 
Bengoetxea gives the ECJ's decision in Cassis de Dijon30 as an example 
of the addition of a "new 'category' of exceptions" - including con-
sumer protection in particular - to those that article 36 of the EC 
Treaty allows Member States to make to the free import of goods in 
27. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena 
(Defrenne II), 1976 E.C.R. 455. 
28. The president of the ECJ acknowledged the weight of economic considerations in a book 
that he published shortly after the judgment in Defrenne ]/. See ROBERT LECOURT, L'EUROPB 
DES JUGES 172 (1976). 
29. 1976 E.C.R. at 480. 
30. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftlr Branntwein (Cassis de 
Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
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intra-Community trade (pp. 273 n.2, pp. 258-59). While this interpre-
tation has indeed been suggested,31 the prevailing view is that the ECJ 
referred in Cassis de Dijon to measures that Member States take with 
regard to both domestic and imported products and that, according to 
the ECJ, article 30 of the EC Treaty implicitly allows under certain 
conditions. 32 If the latter view is correct, the ECJ's decision in Cassis 
de Dijon introduced no new category of exceptions. On the contrary, 
the ECJ appears to have restricted the Member States' freedom in reg-
ulating marketing in their respective territories. The ECJ required 
measures that also affect intra-Community trade to pursue genuinely 
an acceptable goal: a prohibition of marketing fruit liqueurs with a 
low alcoholic content failed to meet this test, although German au-
thorities contended that it protected consumers. 33 
This observation may appear to be a quibble, but it shows how 
difficult it is to write a general overview of the ECJ's reasoning with-
out a thorough knowledge of the various areas of EC law on which the 
Court's judgments were rendered. Also, in an analysis of justification 
it may well be necessary to go beyond an examination of the wording 
of the judgments in order to identify the proper category in which a 
case should be included and to explore why certain criteria were not 
relied upon in a particular judgment. The latter type of analysis, how-
ever, is clearly beyond the reach of a general survey, which may still 
provide - as Bengoetxea's book arguably does - a useful framework 
for more specific inquiries. 
A general study could discuss some questions regarding the use of 
"dynamic criteria" of interpretation. While Bengoetxea's book does 
not address these questions, it indirectly helps to put them in focus. I 
shall frame them as questions, although some replies are implicit. 
First, it may be useful to recall that in the passage of the decision in 
CILFIT quoted above34 the ECJ mentioned the need to refer to the 
"state of evolution" of EC law when interpreting a legal rule. The use 
of dynamic criteria implies that Treaty provisions and, likewise, acts 
adopted by EC institutions may acquire a meaning other than that 
originally intended. Is this consistent with the ECJ's idea in Salumi 35 
that the Court's interpretation of a rule of EC law "clarifies and de-
fines where necessary the meaning and scope of that rule as it must be 
or ought to have been understood and applied from the time of its 
coming into force"?36 Should not the retrospective effect of interpreta-
31. See PETER OLIVER, FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE E.E.C. 208-13 (2d ed. 1988). 
32. See, e.g., ERIC STEIN ET AL., EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LA w AND INSTITUTIONS IN PER-
SPECTIVE 116-17 (Supp. 1985). 
33. 1979 E.C.R. at 664. 
34. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
35. Joined Cases 66, 127, and 128/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze v. S.r.1. Meridionale 
lndustria Salumi, 1980 E.C.R. 1237. 
36. 1980 E.C.R. at 1264 (operative part). 
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tion be limited when a rule is interpreted on the basis of a dynamic 
criterion? Moreover, as the use of dynamic criteria implies that a pro-
vision may acquire a new meaning in the future, how can one assume, 
as the Court suggested in Salumi and other decisions, 37 that, once the 
ECJ has interpreted a provision of EC law, this provision has become 
clear? Could not the future use of dynamic criteria induce the ECJ to 
give a different meaning to the same provision? 
37. See in particular the decision in CILF/T. Case 283/81, Srl C/FIT and Lanijicio di 
Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.CR. 3415. 
